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Evaluating Our Evaluations
Recognizing and Countering 
Performance Evaluation Pitfalls
Lt. Col. Lee A. Evans, PhD, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. G. Lee Robinson, PhD, U.S. Army
Selecting the right person for the right job at the right time is a persistent challenge faced by orga-nizations. Performance evaluations are a funda-
mental component of selection processes, and their use 
in the Army is nearly as old as the service itself. Some 
early evaluation systems consisted of a list of officers in 
a regiment with observations noted for each ranging 
from “a good-natured man” to “merely good—nothing 
promising” to “a man of whom all unite in speaking ill.”1 
While our current evaluation form adds a bit more 
science to the art of performance evaluation, a constant 
in the Army’s performance evaluation system is the reli-
ance on raters to render their judgment on the potential 
of a subordinate for service at higher levels.
Raters need to be better equipped to exercise these 
judgments. While we recognize the calls for personnel 
management reform and the initiatives underway to bet-
ter manage the Army’s talent, our purpose is not to add 
another voice to these suggestions for structural changes 
to the Army’s evaluation system.2 Instead, we focus on 
the process of discretionary judgment exercised by raters 
that is and will continue to be an integral part of perfor-
mance evaluation. Our aim is to recognize the structural 
and cognitive biases inherent in our evaluation system 
and provide recommendations to help senior raters more 
objectively evaluate their subordinates.
While we think the importance of this topic is 
self-evident, educating raters on the potential for bias 
in their evaluations is especially important in the type 
of rating system used by the Army. This system places 
great emphasis on the person serving as the senior 
rater. Although the evaluation forms include assess-
ments from raters and sometimes intermediate raters, 
the senior rater comments are widely acknowledged 
to carry the most weight for promotion and selection 
decisions due to the small amount of time available to 
evaluate a soldier’s file.3 Most positions involve work 
that is highly interdependent on other members of the 
organization, which places a considerable demand on 
raters to assess and articulate how much an individual 
contributed to the output of the group.4
While the performance of an officer is undoubtedly 
important to his or her chances for promotion or selec-
tion, the abilities of the officer’s senior rater to convey the 
level of this performance through an evaluation is also 
vital to talent management. Previous studies demon-
strate that exposure to a high-quality mentor increases 
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an officer’s likelihood of an early promotion to major 
by 29 percent, perhaps because high-quality mentors 
are skilled at communicating their protégé’s potential 
in their performance evaluations.5 Equipping raters to 
make their best possible judgments of subordinates and 
clearly articulating these judgments is vital to fostering a 
meritocratic Army talent management system.
Evaluating the Performance 
Evaluation Tool: Structural Biases in 
the Department of the Army Form 67
In 1922, the Army introduced a formalized perfor-
mance appraisal system, the War Department Adjutant 
General's Office (WD AGO) Form 711, Efficiency Report, 
rebranded two years later as the WD AGO Form 67, 
to assess officers in the domains of physical qualities, 
intelligence, leadership, personal qualities, and general 
value to the service.6 Since 1922, the Army modified DA 
Form 67 ten times; the most recent iteration was the DA 
Form 67-10 series (hereafter referred to collectively as 
DA Form 67-10).7 Each iteration of the officer evalua-
tion form contained nuanced approaches to segment the 
population in order to accurately represent the spectrum 
of officer performances from the highest performing of-
ficers to those who should not be retained in the service. 
DA Form 67-10 uses a forced distribution technique 
where senior raters of lieutenant colonels and below can 
award “most qualified” evaluations to fewer than half of 
their subordinates. (For comparison, an example of the 
1934 efficiency report format is shown on pages 94–95 
to highlight the perennial challenges the Army has faced 
over time in capturing and expressing an effective and 
fair means of comparing the performances of officers.) 
Forced distribution rating systems have been common 
in the Department of Defense and the civilian sector 
because of the problem of appraisal distortion in the 
absence of forced distribution.8 For example, prior to im-
plementing a forced distribution performance appraisal 
system, the U.S. Navy saw the majority of its officers 
rated in the top 1 percent.9 In theory, forced distribution 
decreases ratings inflation and provides the means for a 
variety of human resources decisions, including promo-
tion, training, and assignment of personnel.
However, even under a best-case scenario (with the 
absence of cognitive biases), system structure induces 
error in a forced distribution performance appraisal 
system. Allan Mohrman alluded to this problem in his 
argument that forced distribution systems should be 
applied to large enough groups of employees, specifically 
over fifty.10 While he failed to provide mathematical 
support for this number, his argument relies on the 
statistical qualities of large sample sizes. For example, 
if a reasonably large sample, typically n > 30, is drawn 
from a population with a normal distribution, the sam-
ple mean and the standard deviation of the sample are 
nearly indistinguishable from that of the population.11 
In the context of officer performance and potential, as-
suming both are normally distributed, this suggests that 
larger samples of officers will provide a more accurate 
representation of performance levels across the force. 
While larger samples are typically a good representation 
of performance level distribution, they are in direct con-
flict with the concept of pooling introduced by Army 
Regulation (AR) 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System.
AR 623-3 defines pooling as “elevating the rating 
chain beyond the senior rater’s ability to have adequate 
knowledge of each Soldier’s performance and potential, 
in order to provide an elevated assessment protection for 
a specific group.”12 The word “pooling” appears more than 
ten times in the most recent version of AR 623-3, which 
states that pooling runs counter to the intent of the 
evaluation system and erodes soldiers’ confidence in the 
fairness and impartiality of their leaders.13
Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number 
of subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to 
have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the soldiers they rate. The idea of an organiza-
tional structure that limits the number of subordinates 
under a rater’s span of control is also a common practice 
in the civilian sector. The manager-to-employee ratio 
across industries worldwide is approximately 1:4 for com-
panies with five hundred or fewer employees and 1:9 for 
companies with greater than five hundred employees.14
While there are many sound reasons that the Army 
seeks to decrease a rater’s span of control, an often over-
looked downside of this practice is the presence of errors 
resulting from a forced distribution system, especially 
in small rating pools. According to AR 623-3, a senior 
rater should award “most qualified” evaluations to the top 
one-third of officers, and the number of “most qualified” 
evaluations they award must be less than 50 percent of 
the total number of evaluations he or she writes.
With a few simplifying assumptions, such as 
officers distributed randomly into rating pools of five 
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and the raters having perfect clarity on whether a 
subordinate is a top one-third officer, the hypergeo-
metric distribution (as explained below) provides 
insight into the mathematical pitfalls of a forced 
distribution performance appraisal system.
The hypergeometric distribution has three parame-
ters: N, R, and n. The parameter N represents the num-
ber of items in the population, R represents the number 
of “successes,” and n is the sample size drawn from the 
population. Using this nomenclature, we can determine 
that the random variable is X~Hypergeometric(N, R, n)
and calculate the probability that X (in our case, the 
number of “most qualified” officers in a rating pool) 
takes on particular, discrete values.
For example, if there are five thousand officers of 
a particular rank, 1,667 of them would be consid-
ered the top one-third based on established criteria. 
We can calculate the probability of receiving ex-
actly x top one-third officers in a group of n size. If 
we assume a pool size of five officers, we would use 
X~Hypergeometric(5000, 1667, 5) to calculate the 
probability that we receive exactly x top one-third 
officers in our rating pool, notationally P(X = x). That 
is, P(X = 2) represents the probability that exactly two 
top one-third officers were assigned to a rating pool 
of five. In fact, P(X = 2) = 0.329, meaning there is a 
32.9 percent chance that there would be exactly two 
top one-third officers in a rating pool of five, assuming 
officers are randomly distributed into ratings pools. 
Thus, given the current profile constraint of less than 
50 percent, raters could only award two “most quali-
fied” evaluations to a pool of five officers.
The rater’s ability to discern the two top one-third 
performers is affected by cognitive biases, but math-
ematically, the rater may be obligated to award an 
evaluation that is not commensurate with a subordi-
nate’s level of performance due to forced distribution 
requirements. For example, if a rater has a pool size of 
five, but has more than two top one-third performers, 
at least one rated officer will receive an inaccurate 
evaluation due to the rater’s profile constraint. We can 
calculate this expected annual error with E[Annual 
Error]. Notationally, for a rating pool of five officers, 
this is represented by E[Annual Error] =  (i – 2)
P(X = i) = P(X = 3) + 2P(X = 4) + 3P(X = 5). That is, 
when there are three top one-third officers in a rating 
pool of five, one officer is adversely affected by the 
profile constraint. When there are four top one-third 
officers, two officers are affected by the profile con-
straint. When all five officers are top one-third officers, 
three officers are affected by the profile constraint.
An E[Annual Error] = 0.259 means that for each 
rating pool of five officers, 0.259 (or about one officer 
per rating pool every four years) would not receive the 
top evaluation they deserved. If five thousand officers 
are randomly placed into pools of five, even under 
conditions of perfect clarity of the rater to discern 
performance level and follow the guidance in AR 623-3 
to reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the top one-
third officers, we would expect that 259 officers per 
year do not receive the evaluation they deserve.
Addressing Structural Biases
We suggest three ways to counter structural biases. 
First, senior raters should follow the guidance in AR 
623-3 and reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the 
top one-third officers. This requires a discerning eye, 
and as previously mentioned, will result in an expected 
annual error of about one officer per rating pool every 
four years for a rating pool of five officers. According to 
the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “the lim-
itation of less than 50% translates to an average use of 
37–42% depending on the grade (of the rated officer).”15 
Within this relatively small range, there is a significant 
difference in the expected annual error.
If a senior rater uses the top 37 percent of officers 
as the cutoff for most “qualified” evaluations, it would 
result in an expected annual error of 0.340 whereas a 42 
Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number of 
subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to 
have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the soldiers they rate.
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percent threshold increases the expected annual error 
to 0.469. As seen in figure 1, higher thresholds for what 
percentage of officers should receive a “most qualified” 
evaluation result in monotonically higher than expected 
annual errors. However, senior raters who place these 
thresholds below those of other raters disadvantage some 
of their subordinates who would have received “most 
qualified” evaluations in other rating pools. Therefore, a 
senior rater would want to award a similar percentage of 
“most qualified” evaluations as other senior raters across 
the Army to ensure his or her subordinates are not dis-
advantaged but low enough to prevent instances where 
the number of “most qualified” officers within their 
rating pools exceeds the profile constraint.
Second, we recommend senior raters have a 
multiyear focus and refrain from maximizing the 
number of “most qualified” evaluations awarded each 
year. The U.S. Human Resources Command stated 
that the 37–42 percent use of “most qualified” eval-
uations by senior raters is “indicative of senior raters 
correctly retaining a buffer.”16 This guidance assumes 
that anything less than 50 percent constitutes a 
buffer. However, figure 2 (on page 93) shows that the 
maximum allowable percentage of “most qualified” 
evaluations does not remain above 42 percent until 
a senior rater completes twenty-five evaluations. For 
example, if a senior rater completes eight evaluations, 
at most, three of them can be “most qualified” eval-
uations, putting the senior rater profile usage at 37.5 
percent. If the senior rater kept a buffer of just one 
evaluation, the profile usage drops to 25 percent.
Maximizing the number of “most qualified” evalu-
ations awarded often results in either a Type I or Type 
II error. In the context of performance appraisals, a 
Type I error is incorrectly identifying an officer as 
most qualified, whereas Type II error is not identify-
ing a most qualified officer as such. If a senior rater 
has a rating pool of five officers and is predetermined 
to award the maximum of two top evaluations, there 
is only a 34.6 percent chance that there are exactly 
two top 40 percent officers in a pool of randomly dis-
tributed officers. There is a 33.7 percent chance that 
there are fewer than two top 40 percent officers, lead-
ing to a Type I error, and a 31.7 percent chance there 
are more than two top 40 percent officers, leading to 
a Type II error. A senior rater’s profile constraint can 





















Figure 1. Expected Annual Error as a Function of a Senior 
Rater’s “Most Qualified” Threshold 
(Figure by authors)
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induce a Type II error, but a Type I error is caused by 
either cognitive biases or conscious decisions.
A conscious decision to award a “most qualified” 
evaluation to an undeserving officer can have com-
pounding effects 
since rating profiles 
are cumulative. We 
analyze this effect by 
calculating the expect-
ed two-year error. If 
a senior rater plans to 
maximize the number 
of “most qualified” 
evaluations awarded, 
presumably off of a 
top 40 percent stan-
dard, it will result in 
an expected annual 
error of 0.415 and an 
expected two-year er-
ror of 0.830 for a pool 
size of five. However, 
if a senior rater can 
use the top one-third 
standard for award-
ing “most qualified” 
evaluations, there will 
be an expected annual 
error of 0.259 and an 
expected two-year 
error of 0.416.
The reason that 
the expected two-year error is not double that of the 
expected annual error is that if there is only one top 
one-third officer in the rating pool the first year, the 
senior rater can award up to three “most qualified” 
evaluations the second year. Similarly, if there are no 
top one-third officers in the rating pool the first year, 
a senior rater can award up to four “most qualified” 
evaluations the second year. In summary, by resisting 
the urge to award the maximum allowable number of 
top evaluations each year and maintaining a top one-
third standard, senior raters can reduce Type II errors 
by nearly 50 percent. Consequently, coaching officers 
to have a multiyear focus is especially important since 
recent research shows how an officer’s seniority affects 
the evaluations they receive in the evaluation process.17
Third, consistent with AR 623-3, we recommend 
that senior raters structure rating schemes to provide 
flexibility to reward the best subordinates. When dis-
cussing the establishment of rating chains, AR 623-3 
provides general guidance, such as commanders rating 
commanders, and prohibits the practice of pooling. 
However, it gives organizations the latitude to estab-
lish and publish their rating scheme at the beginning 
of each period. While the recommended size of rating 
pools cannot be generalized across nonhomogeneous 
units, organizations should establish rating chains that 
do not disadvantage officers at each grade level.
For example, increasing our sample rating pool of 
five officers to ten officers decreases both the expected 
annual error and the expected annual two-year error. 
As previously stated, using the criteria of top one-third 
officers deserving “most qualified” evaluations, the 
expected annual error for a pool size of five is 0.259 and 
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Figure 2. Profile Usage for Senior Raters Who Maximize 
Their “Most Qualified” Evaluations and Those Who 
Keep a Buffer of One 
(Figure by authors)
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Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936
(Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)
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Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936 (continued)
(Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)
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of the rating pool to ten officers while maintaining the 
top one-third most qualified officer threshold drops 
the expected two-year error to 0.364. Since the expect-
ed two-year error is for two years of officers in a pool 
size of ten, we can compare it to the expected two-year 
error for a pool size of five by dividing by two. Doubling 
the rating pool size from five to ten thus results in a 56 
percent decrease in Type II errors.
Evaluating the Evaluator: 
Cognitive Biases
As evidenced in the previous section, there are 
structural biases introduced by the DA Form 67-10 that 
make it difficult for raters to consistently reward the best 
officers. In addition to these structural biases, because of 
the discretionary nature of performance evaluation, there 
are also cognitive biases that may affect the judgment of 
senior raters. We focus on five cognitive biases that may 
lead to a difference between the performance of an officer 
and how this performance translates to the potential 
described by a senior rater in an evaluation report.
A cognitive bias occurs when a rater unknowingly 
renders judgments that are unrelated to an officer’s 
performance. Because raters have great discretion 
in how they articulate the potential of an officer in 
an evaluation, cognitive biases have the potential to 
influence the enthusiasm they use to describe a soldier 
in the narrative portion of the report.
These choices are especially important because 
there is likely a small talent differential between offi-
cers just above and just below the cutline in promo-
tion and selection boards. There is anecdotal evidence 
to support this point from officers who served on 
promotion boards, but we also see empirical support 
for small differences between primary and alternate 
selectees in other fields.18 Since selection boards have 
little time to review files and consider a relatively 
minimal amount of information, reducing the effects 
of cognitive bias can make a difference in the iden-
tification and selection of officers with the greatest 
potential for service at higher levels.19 Stated differ-
ently, the more bias we can divest from evaluations, 
the better positioned selection boards will be to make 
the difficult choices inherent in talent management of 
a large pool of candidates.
A key point on cognitive bias is that it is uninten-
tional. Evaluating a person’s performance is undoubt-
edly complex. How much of performance is due to a 
person’s talent versus the interactive effects from the 
group? And how does their performance compare to 
their peers who faced similar tasks but did so un-
der different conditions with different teammates? 
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman shaped much of 
what we understand about complex decision-making 
with his insights on System 1 and System 2 thinking. 
System 1 thinking normally guides our decisions as it 
operates automatically and enables us to make most 
decisions with little or no effort. When faced with 
more complex tasks, System 2 thinking enables us to 
focus our attention on more complex computations. 
While we like to think we can put System 2 in control 
when needed, Kahneman suggests that System 1 often 
takes over in the face of complexity.20
For instance, if asked what you think the president’s 
popularity will be six months from now, what system 
would you use? Kahneman claims this is a System 2 
task since an accurate answer would require a person to 
consider the events between present time and six months 
in the future that would potentially affect the presi-
dent’s popularity and render judgment on the likelihood 
of these events. Instead of performing these complex 
calculations, we rely on System 1 thinking, which would 
use the president’s current popularity to gauge what his 
popularity will be six months from now.
A similar process unfolds for performance evalua-
tion. To complete the difficult task of assessing someone’s 
The more bias we can divest from evaluations, the 
better positioned selection boards will be to make 
the difficult choices inherent in talent management of 
a large pool of candidates.
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performance, we use shortcuts that rely on information 
that is already stored in memory. The benefit of System 
1 thinking is that it enables us to rely on intuition to 
perform such complex tasks, but the downside is that 
this process invites bias. Our System 1 thinking may 
succumb to the following five sources of bias when faced 
with the complexity of performance evaluation. The 
more we are aware of these biases, the better equipped 
we are to slow down our System 1 thinking and engage 
some System 2 functions to counter these biases.
Halo effects. As the name implies, halo effects occur 
when we use performance in one dimension to influence 
our evaluation of a person in all other dimensions. The 
primary problem of halo effects is that they decrease the 
number of opportunities for a person to demonstrate his 
proficiency, thereby precluding the rater from evaluat-
ing the ratee accurately across different dimensions of 
performance.21 Raters are especially susceptible to halo 
effects in systems where a single evaluator rates a person 
on multiple dimensions—as is the case with our eval-
uation system and the Army leadership requirements 
model with its core competencies and attributes.22
The halo effect can be positive or negative. For 
example, an officer who performs well in the attri-
bute of competence by projecting self-confidence and 
a commanding presence may enjoy a positive halo 
effect across the other competencies and attributes. 
Conversely, an officer who shows a lack of self-confi-
dence and commanding presence may suffer a negative 
halo effect across the other competencies and attributes.
First impression error. This bias stems from ini-
tial impressions, either favorable or unfavorable, that 
influence a rater’s evaluation. Similar to halo effects, the 
primary problem of initial impression error is that a 
rater may suppress or discount subsequent information 
about a ratee if it is counter to their initial impression.23 
This effect can be especially prevalent when a senior rat-
er rates a large pool of a particular position or rank and 
has few interactions with each individual.
Similar to me effect. This bias stems from a tendency 
of some raters to judge a person favorably when he or she 
resembles the rater along dimensions such as his or her 
attitude or background.24 Some recent studies indicate 
that the military may be especially susceptible to this bias 
in comparison to other professions. A study of Army 
War College students found that this population scored 
lower on openness than the general U.S. population.25 
A characteristic of people with low scores on openness 
is that they prefer familiarity over novelty; thus, lower 
scores for openness may be associated with less favorable 
judgments of ratees who are significantly different than 
the raters. Other studies indicate service academy cadets 
score lower on innovative cognitive style (which is posi-
tively correlated with a willingness to adopt new ideas) 
than students at comparable civilian universities, and 
those who left the academy after their first year scored 
higher on innovation than those who remained.26
A study of the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and promotion/selection found that officers with 
significantly higher cognitive abilities had 29 percent 
lower odds of selection below the zone (ahead of peers) to 
major, 18 percent lower odds for selection below the zone 
to lieutenant colonel, and 32 percent lower odds for selec-
tion to battalion command.27 One explanation for these 
results is that officers with high cognitive abilities may 
make “worse” junior officers since they may be less likely 
to be hypercompliant in comparison to those of average 
or lower cognitive ability. By this reasoning, the “similar to 
me effect” may contribute to these results.
Central tendency error. The central tendency error 
occurs when raters score most ratees as average or slight-
ly above average.28 Although there are four blocks on the 
officer evaluation report, raters rarely use the “qualified” 
or “not qualified” box. While there are consequences for 
a rater to “bust their profile” by scoring too many officers 
as “most qualified,” there are no consequences for placing 
too many officers in the “highly qualified” category.
In situations where there are no consequences for 
too many average ratings, there is a greater potential 
for ratings inflation.29 Qualified or not qualified ratings 
involve additional work for the rater in terms of greater 
potential for interpersonal conflict with the ratee or the 
requirement for performance counseling documents if 
the rated officer appeals the evaluation. Since no conse-
quences exist for establishing gradations in the quality 
of performance for those who are not “most qualified,” it 
is easier to rate someone as “highly qualified” than to use 
the lower two rankings. While our professional ethos is 
a check against this bias, we include it in this discussion 
since the potential exists for this bias.
Duration neglect. The essence of duration 
neglect is the tendency to place greater emphasis 
on peak time periods and recency when recalling 
events. To illustrate this effect, Kahneman discussed 
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a study of how patients recalled a colonoscopy. 
While the duration of the procedure had no effect 
on the patients’ ratings of total pain, the average level 
of pain at the worst moment of the procedure and at 
the end of the procedure were strong predictors of 
the overall evaluation of pain.
Hopefully, pain is not an emotion that raters recall 
during an evaluation, but the general principle applies 
for how this bias may influence evaluations. Instead of 
engaging System 2 processes to consider the performance 
of a ratee over a series of events, it is easier to use a key 
event such as an inspection, a training exercise, or the 
most recent training event to shape the impression a 
senior rater wishes to convey in an evaluation.
Addressing Cognitive Biases
We suggest three ways to counter these cognitive 
biases. Reading this article and becoming aware of coun-
tering sources of cognitive bias is the first step. While we 
hope that readers will find this information helpful, we 
think it is especially important to include education on 
these biases as part of professional military education. 
While professional military education courses often 
cover board processes and trends, they do not currently 
include training on these biases. We think that just as fu-
ture battalion and brigade commanders receive training 
on managing their profile, they should receive training 
on rater biases to become better evaluators.
Second, since the source of these biases is a system 
that relies on evaluations by a single rater, we recom-
mend that raters seek input from different sources 
to help form their judgment of a ratee. One of the 
authors has experience with this technique while 
serving as a battalion executive officer. The battalion 
commander asked the operations officer, command 
sergeant major, senior chief warrant officer, and 
the author to rank the six company commanders. 
After submitting the feedback, the author compared 
his recommendations with those of the operations 
officer and found that his ratings were the opposite 
for the six commanders. While differences of opinion 
will probably not always be this stark, there is value 
in raters receiving a diversity of opinions to counter 
possible sources of cognitive bias.
Third, frequent feedback to subordinates can 
help counter bias, especially if a rater is aware of the 
potential biases discussed above. Frequent feedback 
can foster agreement on performance standards and 
increase acceptance of feedback by subordinates.30 
This is an area that many leaders struggle with. In 
the 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey 
of Army Leadership, over one-third of respondents 
reported their supervisors rarely or never took time 
to discuss how they were doing with their work and 
what they could do to improve their performance.31
Conclusion
In reality, the Army’s performance appraisal 
system is a multiyear assessment that is prone to 
disparities between senior raters and the profiles 
they maintain. As this article demonstrates, there 
are structural and cognitive biases that may affect 
the rating an officer receives. These biases under-
mine the meritocratic principles that we seek in our 
performance evaluation system. The more that we are 
aware of these biases, the better position we will be in 
to counter their effects.   
Editor's note: We wish to express our appreciation to library 
research archivists Russell Rafferty and Elizabeth Dubuisson 
of the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, for their support in locating early ver-
sions of Army efficiency reports and references to them in period 
official technical manuals.   
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